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Criticism Rates as Indicators
of Credit Quality, 1947-57
Our analysis, which so far has dealt largely with the structural and
quality characteristics of borrowers, now shifts to the aggregate of
criticized loans, and to the fluctuations in this aggregate and its major
components over the eleven years (1947-57) covered by our series.
Most of the data used here come from the summary reports that
the examiners prepare following every examination. These reports,
which show the total dollar volume of criticized loans for each bank,
were tabulated for fifty-nine of the sixty banks in the original sample.
(One bank had to be omitted because of an unresolvable data problem
caused by a merger.) The main emphasis is on the criticized loans
classified as "substandard": this designation most closely approximates
a predictive measure of low loan quality. Loans classified as "doubtful"
and "loss," by contrast, represent loans on which sizable losses are
considered certain and on which delinquency presumably has akeady
occurred; the designations "doubtful" and "loss" are thus primarily
after-the-fact recordings.
Several different summary measures of criticized loans were em-
ployed. They included (1) simple dollar aggregates; (2) the over-all
percentage of loans criticized, obtained by dividing the total of all
criticized (or substandard) loans by the aggregate of all loans; and
(3) the average percentage of loans criticized "per bank," obtained by
calculating criticism rates for each bank individually and averaging
them. The first two measures, of course, give most weight to the larger
banks with high loan totals and were, in fact, dominated by the results
for the largest banks, primarily the giant New York City banks. The
average "per bank" ratios, on the other hand, were subject to distortion
39The Quality of Bank Loans
by the extreme criticism rates found for some small banks. Annual
frequency distributions of banks according to the level of criticism
rates (i.e., how many banks had no criticized loans, how many had
less than 1 per cent of loans criticized) were also constructed. All of
the ratio measures involving criticized loans, moreover, were calcu-
lated in two forms: (1) as ratios to total loans, and (2) as ratios to
business loans. The second form was suggested by the earlier finding
that most of the criticized loans were business loans.
Amount and Distribution of Criticized Loans
Substandard loans comprise the bulk ofallcriticized loans and
dominate the fluctuations in the total (see Table 11 and Chart 1). The
volume of "doubtful" loans was minuscule.' The volume of loans classi-
fied as "loss," though larger, fluctuated widely and with no apparent
relation to the general business cycle.
The total amount of substandard loans at the fifty-nine banks that
were studied ranged, during the eleven years from 1947 through 1957,
from a low of $18 million in 1951 to a high of $49 million in 1955. Large
banks (defined here and throughout as banks with deposits of $100
million or over) accounted for most of the total in all years: for $14
out of $18 million in 1951, for example, and for $42 out of $49 million
in 1955. And of these amounts, the large banks in the New York Dis-
trict contributed impressive shares: $12 million in 1951 and $35 million
in 1955. For all New York banks, small and large, taken together, the
low for substandard loans was $16 million in 1951, the high $39 million
in 1955. By contrast, total substandard loans for the twenty Atlanta
banks ranged from a low of less than $1 million to a high of $9 million.
From these figures it is readily apparent that all results based on loan
aggregates are heavily weighted by the large New York banks.
When the volume of substandard loans is expressed as a per-
centage of total loans, the results range from a low of 0.55 per cent
in 1951 to a high of 1.87 per cent in 1948 (Table 12 and Chart 2). Ex-
pressed as a proportion of only business rather than total loans, these
rates are of course higher: 0.82 and 2.81 per cent, Over
'It is interesting to note, however, that the behavior of the "doubtful" category
corresponded rather closely to that of the volume of losses on loans at all insured
commercial banks.
40Criticism Rates as Indicators of Credit Quality
TABLE11





1947 28.1 25.1 2.2 0.8 1,385.3 1,960.2
1948 46.0 40.7 1.3 4.0 1,453.6 2,160.4
1949 42.4 35.4 1.4 5.6 1,291.7 2,152.0
1950 36.7 28.8 1.1 6.7 1,618.0 2,762.1
1951 26.8 18.2 1.5 6.5 2,211.0 3,334.5
1952 33.4 24.4 1.2 7.8 2,337.4 3,570.6
1953 48.9 37.1 2.3 9.5 2,372.7 4,112.6
1954 41.2 31.7 0.9 8.6. 2,176.2 4,062.0
1955 57.6 48.6 2.3 6.7 2,688.8 4,888.9
1956 62.3 48.2 10.5 3.5 3,161.2 5,371.4
1957 52.3 43.2 3.8 5.2 3,264.9 5,537.3
PERCENTAGE OFCRITICIZEDLOANS
1947 100 89 8 3
1948 100 88 3 9
1949 100 84 3 13
1950 100 79 3 18 .
1951 100 69 6 25
1952 100 73 4 23
1953 100 76 5 19
1954 100 77 2 21
1955 100 84 4 12
1956 100 77 17 6
1957 100 83 7 10
NOTE: Data not available for all fifty-nine banks in all years.
SOURCE: Bank Examination Survey.
time, however, the two sets of rates follow a largely parallel course.
As noted, these results reflect primarily the record of the New York
banks, particularly in the early years of the period when interdistrict
differences were large. Such differences narrowed considerably after
1950. Small banks had higher criticism rates than large banks in all
years, but this result was influenced by the lower examiner cut-off
points used at small banks. At small banks, more of the riskier loans
to small businesses would be evaluated.
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NOTE:Shaded areas represent reference cycle contractions according to National
Bureau annual chronology.
SouRcE: Table 11.
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TABLE12
SUBSTANDARDLOANS AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL
AND OF BUSINESS LOANS, BY SIZE OF
AND BY Dismicr, 1947-57
All Large Small Phila-
Banks Banksa BanksaNew Yorkdeiphia Atlanta
A. PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL LOANS
1947 1.27 1.22 1.94 1.50 0.24 2.66
1948 1.87 1.77 3.34 2.33 0.18 0.52
1949 1.63 1.56 2.51 2.cfl 0.28 0.67
1950 1.04 1.01 1.43 1.24 0.40 0.39
1951 0.55 0.45 1.61 0.64 0.24 0.54
1952 0.73 0.68 1.23 0.88 0.32 0.44
1953 0.93 0.89 1.38 1.12 0.39 0.78
1954 0.87 0.81 1.42 0.91 0.69 0.98
1955 1.06 1.02 1.42 1.15 0.74 1.08
1956 0.90 0.88 1.13 1.05 0.53 0.77
1957 0.78 0.71 1.54 0.81 0.64 1.10
B. PERCENTAGE OF J3USINESS LOANS
1947 1.71 1.61 1.96 0.36 3.55
1948 2.81 2.74 3.19 0.29 1.31
1949 2.62 2.43 3.11 0.51 1.64
1950 1.73 1.62 1.89 0.72 1.38
1951 0.82 0.66 0.88 0.46 1.49
1952 1.09 0.99 1.16 0.66 0.97
1958 1.60 1.47 1.73 0.91 2.19
1954 1.60 1.42 1.52 1.84 2.65
1955 1.93 1.80 1.85 2.14 2.89
1956 1.53 1.44 1.57 1.28 1.90
1957 1.33 1.15 1.24 1.40 2.87
Banks in
sample 59 13 46 19 20 20
NOTE: Percentages are calculated from the loan aggregate for each class of
banks. In each year, oniy those banks for which both substandard and total (or
business) loans were available are included. See the first column of panel A,
Table 14, for the number of banks actually reflected in panel A above. See the
first column of panel B in Table 14 for the number of banks reflected in panel
B above.
For small banks, the criticism rates based on business loans are not shown,
because some of these banks have significant amounts of criticized nonbusiness loans.
SouRcE: Bank Examination Survey.
aLargebanks are those with deposits of $100 million and over, small banks
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CHART2
Examiner Criticism Rates: Various Concepts
NOTE: Shaded areas represent
National Bureau annual chronology.
Tables 12 and 13.
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The predominance of the New York banks is minimized by con-
sidering the banks individually and averaging the criticism rates thus
obtained. Since small banks are more numerous and generally have
higher criticism rates than large banks, this procedure produces a
somewhat higher criticism rate relative to total loans in most years. The
effect on the ratio of substandard to business loans is considerably more
pronounced: as opposed to the range of 0.82 to 2.81 per cent obtained
previously, the range when each bank is given the same weight is
from 3.72 to 6.44 per cent (Table 13). These markedly higher rates
reflect the disproportionate influence of a few small (probably rural)
banks with very little in the way of business loans in their loan port-
TABLE13
AVERAGERATIOS OF SUBSTANDARD TO TOTAL AND TO
BUSINESS LOANS, BY SIZE OF BANK, 1947-57
(per cent)
A. Ratio to TotalLoans
Small
Banksb











1947 1.55 1.11 1.72 4.90 2.00
1948 1.65 1.15 1.83 5.06 1.86
1949 1.81 1.07 2.07 4.76 2.23
1950 1.16 0.79 1.26 6.44 1.44
1951 1.07 0.51 1.24 3.95 1.25
1952 1.10 0.67 1.20 3.72 1.51
1953 0.95 0.67 1.03 4.62 1.40 •
1954 0.93 0.87 0.95 4.27 2.75
1955 0.98 0.80 1.02 4.80 2.76
1956 0.95 0.74 1.02 4.40 2.65 .
1957 1.15 0.65 1.29 5.49 1.33
NOTE: Percentages were calculated by averaging results for individual banks.
Ratio to business loans for small banks is not shown, because some banks have
significant amounts of criticized nonbusiness loans.
SOURCE; Bank Examination Survey.
aBankswith ratios over 100 per cent excluded.
bLarge banks are those with deposits of $100 million and over, small banks
those with deposits of under $100 million.
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folios. Their ratios of criticized loans (perhaps largely farm loans) to
business loans are therefore very high, in a few instances exceeding
100 per cent.
In general, between one-fifth. and one-third of the banks had no
substandard loans at all (Table 14). Most of these banks are of course
small; large banks with many loans are likely to have at least a few that
are criticized. Close.to half of the banks experienced substandard rates
higher than zero, but less than 1 per cent of total loans; most of the
TABLE14
DIsTRIBuTIoNOF BANKS AccorwiNc TO




0.001- 1- 5- 10- 20 and
Banks 0 0.999 4.999 9.999 19.999 over
A.SUBSTANDARD LOANS TO TOTALLOANS
1947 43 28 87 30 7 2 0
1948 45 31 24 36
28 30 30
7 2 0
1949 46 7 4 0
1950 57 25 42 28 5 0 0
1951 56 30 45 18 7 0 0
1952 55 29 40 24 5 2 0
1953 58 21 43 36 0 0 0
1954 58 19 52 28 2 0 0
1955 58 22 47 28 3 0 0
1956 59 20 42 86 2 0 0
1957 58 24 40 84 2 0 0
B.SUBSTANDARD LOANS TO BUSINESSLOANS
1947 51 22 29 22 8 16 4
1948 54 28 22 17 19 7 7
1949 55 29 11 33 15 2 11
1950 55 24 16 33 9 9 9
1951 56 30 16 29 12 7 5
1952 54 28 26 22 13 7 4
1958 57 21 25 26 16 9 . 4
1954 56 20 23 30 11 11 5
1955 58 22 12 38 16 9 3
1956 59 20 22 29 17 7 5
1957 58 24 14 81 14 9 9
SOURCE: Bank Examination Survey.
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large banks are generally to be found in this group. Together, banks
with no substandard loans at all, and those with a substandard rate
of less than 1 per cent, ranged from 55 to 75 per cent of all banks. The
bulk of the remaining banks had substandard rates of less than 5 per
cent of total loans, but in most years, especially earlier in the period,
four or five did incur criticism rates in excess of 5 per cent. Rarely,
however, did the rate exceed 10 per cent of total loans, and never 20
per cent. The number of banks with high criticism rates declined
appreciably during 1947-57.
When the volume of substandard loans is related to business loans,
the typical rates are of course higher. In most years, the largest number
of banks fell in the 1-5 per cent range, while some banks had rates
exceeding 10 and even 20 per cent. As pointed out previously, however,
these high rates occurred mainly at small banks with very few business
loans; it seems likely, therefore, that the loans criticized at these banks
were in fact largely nonbusiness loans.
Examiner Criticism Rates as Measures of
Fluctuations in Aggregate Loan Quality
Having sketched the major features of this group of banks from
the viewpoint of examiner criticism, itis once again appropriate to
inquire into the validity of criticism rates as measures of loan quality.
It was shown in Chapter 2 that, taking the eleven years covered by the
survey as a whole, there was a significant though low correlation be-
tween criticism and loss rates on a bank-by-bank basis—and it was
explained why this particular juxtaposition was in many ways an "un-
fair" test of examiner efficiency. In Chapter 3, the industry and size
differentials in criticism rates were found to correspond approximately
to those in other measures of credit quality.
These earlier results showed essentially the adeptness of the ex-
aminers at picking out potentially troublesome loans from all those
examined on a given date. We now focus on the validity of changes
in criticism rates as indicators of changes in loan quality.
Changes in the criticism rate for a given group of banks might
perhaps be expected to anticipate fluctuations in loss rates. The year-
to-year changes in the aggregate criticism and loss rates for these banks
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CHART3
Criticism and Gross Loss Rates, 1947-57
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C. Small Banks in SampleCriticism Rates as Indicators of Credit Quality
NOTE AND SOURCE TO CHART 3
NOTE: Criticism rates refer to year indicated, loss rates to the following year.
Criticism rates are ratios of substandard to total loans; gross loss rates, ratios of
charge-offs to total loans. All ratios are calculated from loan aggregates. Large banks
are those with deposits of $100 million or over. Shaded areas represent reference
cycle contractions according to National Bureau annual chronology.
Tables 12 and 15.
(as well as for all member banks in these three districts) were in fact
fairly parallel, with the criticism rate tending to lead (Chart 3). The
lead largely reflected the pattern of criticism and loss rates at the
larger banks. The direction of year-to-year changes in the criticism and
loss rates for large banks corresponded in six of ten years when same-
year figures were compared, but this was increased to nine out of ten
cases when criticism rates for each year were compared with loss rates
for the following year. At small banks, where the amplitude of the
swings in both rates was much narrower, the year-to-year changes in
the two series corresponded in less than half the years, whether or not
same-year figures were used. On the other hand, the general trend in
loss rates at large banks in the sample was upward over 1947-56, while
the trend in their criticism rates was downward. The frends in the loss
and criticism rates of small banks in the sample were more nearly
alike.
There were persistent differences in the level of criticism rates
among Federal Reserve Districts, and among banks of different sizes,
that were not accompanied by parallel differences in loss rates. Thus,
although the proportion of substandard to total loans was highest in
the New York District, loss rates in New York were generally as low
as or lower than loss rates in the Atlanta and Philadelphia Districts
(see Table 15). A striking divergence also appears when criticism and
loss rates for large and small banks are contrasted. By whatever measure
is used, the criticism rate is higher for small banks than for large banks
in every year. Yet the differences in loss rates between these two classes
of banks in most years are small—and from 1953 or 1954 on (depend-
ing on the measure used), the small banks in our sample had lower
loss rates than the large banks.,2
21n aggregate data, large banks almost invariably show lower loss rates than
small banks. The departure from the norm in the present case is attributable partly
to sizable underrepresentation of very small banks in the sample. But this can be
only a partial explanation. Data for all member banks show that even the larger
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TABLE15
CROSSLoss RATES ON TOTAL BY SIZE OF BANK
AND BY FEDERAL RESERVE DIsTRIcr, 1947-58














A. BASED ON LOSS AND LOAN ACGREGATESb
1947 0.23 0.22 0.38 0.28 0,02 0.05 n.a.
1948 0.04 0.03 0.22 0.04 0.07 0.05 0.13
1949 0.08 0.06 0.21 0.08 0.06 0.09 0.20
1950 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.05 0.11 0.05 0.13
1951 0.05 0.05 0.11 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.10
1952 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.05 0.11 0.11 0.10
1953 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.28 0.12
1954 0.16 0.16 0.11 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.13
1955 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.05 0.22 0.12 0.15
1956 0.25 0.26 0.13 0.27 0.20 0.16 0.20
1957 0.16 0.17 0.13 0.16 0.15 0.26 0.14
1958 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.13
B. AVERAGE LOSS RATE "PER BANK"
1947 0.24 0.27 0.23
1948 0.28 0.06 0.36
1949 0.31 0.09 0.38
1950 0.10 0.08 0.11
1951 0.10 0.06 0.11
1952 0.12 0.07 0.13
1953 0.14 0.15 0.14
1954 0.15 0.25 0.12
1955 0.08 0.15 0.07
1958 0.14 0.18 0.13
1957 0.14 0.14 0,13
Banks in
sample 59 18 48 19 20 20
SouRcE: Bank Examination Survey and Federal Reserve Bulletin.
aLargebanks are those with deposits of $100 million or over, small banks
those with deposits under $100 million.
bIn each year, only those banks for which both loss and loan data are available
are included.
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The aggregate criticism rate for the sample banks also conformed
well with some but not all of various global measures of credit quality
(see Table 16 and Chart 4). The incidence of high and low Dun and
Bradstreet credit ratings, for example, is also a predictive measure of
credit quality, albeit for a different universe of borrowers and lenders.
The upper panel of Chart 4 compares annual data for the examiner
criticism rate with the incidence of low ratings for large firms in the
Dun and l3radstreet universe, the latter adjusted for the differences
in the distribution of firms among industries between the Dun and
Bradstreet and Bank Examination Survey populations.3 During the
seven years covered by this comparison, the year-to-year movements
of this series and of the criticism rate were in the same direction and
roughly similar in magnitude from 1950 to 1955, but diverged in 1956
and 1957.
When the fluctuations in criticism rates are matched against after-
the-fact indicators of quality, such as business discontinuance and
failure rates, the criticism rate appears to have a one-year lead during
most of the period covered (see the lower panel of Chart 4). The
direction of the year-to-year change in the Dun and Bradstreet business
failure rate corresponds to that in the criticism rate in the preceding
year in eight out of ten years. The exceptions are that the declines in
criticism rates in 1956 and 1957 were followed by increases rather than
decreases in the failure rate in 1957 and 1958. A similar comparison
banks in the "under $100 million" deposit class have appreciably higher gross loss
rates than banks whose deposits exceed $100 million; net loss data for Federal
Reserve member banks in the three districts from which the present sample is
drawn show a similar relationship. Apparently, small banks are not only under-
represented in the sample, but even those selected have atypical loss rates.
The year-to-year movements in the aggregate loss rate for the sample banks
closely with those of all member banks in the three Federal Reserve
Districts involved, except for 1955, when the sample loss rate dipped sharply while
that for all member banks rose. For the period as a whole, the sample loss rate
shows a clear uptrend relative to the stable all-member ioss rate, but this probably
reflects the underrepresentation of the smaller banks. Loss rates of large banks were
rising relative to those for small banks during the mid-1950's.
3This was necessary because of the sizable differences in the industrial compo-
sition of the two populations. The Dun and Bradstreet data in the chart are a
weighted average of the incidence rates for the various industries, the 1957 industry
distribution (by number of firms) of the bank examination firms serving as the
weights. The Dun and Bradstreet data for large firms were used because very small
loans are not evaluated by the examiners; see above, Chapter 8, pp. 32-33.
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TABLE
VAJuousINDICATORS OF QUAJ..rrY AND
BUSINESS' MORTALITY, 1947-58
Incidenceof
Examiner Low Credit Business Business
Criticisma Ratingsb Failuresc Discontinuancesd
1947 1.27 n.a. 9.5 6.55
1948 1.87 n.a. 13.6 7.28
1949 1.83 n.a. 23.2 7.69
1950 1.04 12.7 22.9 7.22
1951 0.55 9.7 19.8 6.79
1952 0.73 12.2 18.5 6.70
1953 0.93 13.8 21.2 7.15
1954 0.87 • 11.4 26.1 7.52
1955 1.08 13.5 25.6 7.32
1956 0.90 15.2 29.0 7.80
1957 0.78 17.1 30.7 7.64
1958 n.a. 16.9 7.86
aRatjo (in per cent) of total substandard to total loans (Table 12).
b Percentage of firms with net worth of $20,000 and over rated "fair" or
"poor" by Dun and Bradstreet (weighted average of data in Table 9; see footnote c).
Number of failures per 10,000 firms in the total business population calcu-
lated from Dun and Bradstreet failure statistics and Department of Commerce
business population estimates. The former may be found in February issues of
Dun's Review (1945-51), Dun's Statistical Review (1952-54), and Dun's Review
and Modern Industry (1954-58). The latter appeared in the Survey of Current
May 1959, p. 18, and January 1954, p. 15. This calculated failure rate
differs from the rate as defined in Dun and Bradstreet publications. In these, failures
are expressed as a proportion of all firms listed in the Dun and Bradstreet reference
books.
d Discontinuances as a percentage of the total business population at the
beginning of each year. Survey of Current Buginess, January 1954, pp. 15-18; May
1959, pp. 18-19.
of changes in the discontinuance, rates with those in the criticism rates
of the preceding year shows a correspondence for nine out of ten years;
the exception, continuing the pattern, is the decline in the criticism rate
in 1957 followed by the increase in discontinuances in 1958. In both these
cases, a comparison of the actual series without introducing one-year
lags would show a correspondence in the direction of change in only
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CHART4
Criticism Rates and Other Indicators of Credit Quality, 1947-58
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NOTE:Time scale in lower panel lags one year behind that in upper panel.
Shaded areas represent reference cycle contractions according to National Bureau
annual chronology.
SouRcE: For description of data and sources, see Table 18.
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half the years or fewer. Thus, except in 1956 and 1957, the direction of
change in the proportion of loans classified substandard was a fairly
reliable predictor of the direction of change in business mortality rates.
On the other hand, it was not a good indicator of trend. As the chart
the criticism rate was substantially lower in the 1950's than in
1947-49, while the trend of the other indicators was level or upward.
Fluctuations in the criticism rate showed no relation to movements
in the financial ratios of all manufacturing corporations (Chart 5),.
even though financial ratios are apparently important in the examiners'
appraisal of individual loans.4 However, differences in the populations
that the two sets of data represent may partly explain the divergence.
As part of the Bank Examination Survey of individual loans outstanding
in 1957, financial ratio data for 1953-57 were obtained for the 1957
borrowers that had been on the books in these earlier years.5 On the
average, the ratios showed little change in 1954, declined significantly
in 1955, improved in 1956, and deteriorated once more in 1957. For
1954-56, this accords with the movement of criticism rates. But for
1957, as is the case for all the indicators that have been considered,
the diverge.
The "inconsistency" of the change in criticism rates from 1956 to
1957 compared with that shown by the other indicators may be ex-
plained in several ways. The 1957 decline in the criticism rate based
on aggregate loans of the sample banks was entirely attributable to a
drop in substandard loans at one large bank; the criticism rate for 1957
calculated on a per bank basis (Table 13) does,fact, show a rise
from 1956. Perhaps a larger sample would have yielded a rise in the
aggregate rate also.
There exists, however, an alternative explanation. Average finan-
cial ratios of borrowers with criticized loans were found to be sig-
nificantly lower in 1956 and particularly in 1957 than in previous years.
4lndeed, it would be impossible for any series to conform to all the various
existing indicators of credit quality (such as financial ratios, business mortality rates,
and credit ratings), since these indicators do not conform among themselves.
5For various reasons, the aggregates of these figures are not statistically reliable,
and their meaningfulness would be open to question in any event. The data met
certain tests, however, that permitted the direction of change of the ratios to be
analyzed. See my unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, "Changes in the Quality of
Business Loans of Commercial Banks," Columbia University, December 1960,
pp. 97-103 and 180-189.
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CHART5
Examiner Criticism Rates and Financial Ratios
of Manufacturing Corporations, 1947-58
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NOTE:Ratio data are averages of quarterly figures. Shaded areas refer to
reference cycle contractions according to National Bureau annual chronology.
SouRcE: Criticism rates—Bank Examination Survey. Financial ratios—Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission and Federal Trade Commission, Quarterly Reports
forManufacturingCorporations.
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In these years, in other words, financial ratios which formerly drew
criticism were now escaping it; hence examiner standards for financial
ratios may have been falling. It is conceivable, therefore, that the drop
in the aggregate criticism rate in 1956 and 1957 may reflect some over-
all lowering of examiner standards in those years.6 Financial ratios,
however, areonly one of many criteria of quality used by the examiners.
As the preceding discussion shows, the. cyclical patterns of the various
dimensions of quality for which data exist differ substantially. Thus
it is quite possible that, viewed as a whole, examiner standards remained
unchanged.
A Quarterly Index of Criticism Rates
In ordertoinvestigate the timing relation between movements
of criticism rates and the general business cycle, the examination data
were cast into quarterly form. Although each bank was examined only
once a year, examinations were, of course, conducted the year round,
so that a quarterly time series can, in principle, be constructed simply
by considering the results for those banks examined in any particular
quarter. Unfortunately, the process of splitting the fifty-nine bank
sample into four groups each year did not leave enough banks in the
groups to establish any meaningful pattern. Both the levels of the
results and the. quarter-to-quarter changes were affected by extreme
values for a few
banksalways been examined in the same quarter—say,
always in the first quarter of the year—meaningful year-to-year com-
parisons on a quarterly basis might perhaps have been feasible. How-
ever, surprise is an element in the examination process; in fact, in this
particular sample of banks, only from one-fourth to one-half of the
banks were examined in the same quarter in successive years, and the
particular banks involved from year to year changed, of course, all the
time. Consequently, this avenue of exploration of the quarterly data
also was closed.
A more fruitful effort to make use of intrayear data involved a
"diffusion" approach: in each quarter, the number of banks showing
increases or decreases, respectively, in the ratio of substandard to busi-
ness loans, compared with their previous examination, was counted (see
Table 17). This process, in effect, gives equal weight to every bank,
regardless of its size, the level of its criticism rate, and the magnitude of
6For the detailed analysis, see ibid., pp. 233-238.
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TABLE17
PERCENTAGEOF BANKS WITH LOWER PROPORTION OF
SUBSTANDARD TO BUSINESS LOANS (HIGhER
LOAN THANAT PREvIous






1948 61a 75a 45 '38 49
1949 45 41 53 47 49
1950 46 60 41 62 52
1951 46 50 62 68 61
1952 69a 50 58 50 54
1953 22a 44 43 33 38
1954 50 82 52 17a 48
1955 58 64 31a 64 57
1956 75 50 61a 48 57
1957 29 43 50 57 46
FOUR-QUARTERCENTEREDMOVINGAVERAGE
1948 — — 53 46
1949 43 45 47 49
1950 50 50 52 51
1951 52 56 59 62
1952 62 59 51 44
1953 42 38 39 45
1954 48 47 46 48
1955 45 48 56 57
1956 59 60 53 46
1957 44 44 — —
NOTE: Banks showing no change between successive examinations in the pro-
portion of substandard loans were counted as one-half.
SOURCE: Bank Examination Survey.
aBasedon fewer than ten banks.
any changes. Since the unit of observation is the direction of change in
a bank's criticism rate, the series is, in fact, an index of the rate of
change, rather than of the level of criticism rates.7
7 results when the ratio of substandard to total loans was used were
generally similar but less clear-cut, partly because the information for calculating
these ratios was missing in a much larger number of cases.
57The Quality of Bank Loans
The fact that four to seven quarters may intervene between suc-
cessive examinations of a given bank means that the change in quality
recorded at the time of the examination might have occurred (or
started to occur) much earlier. Accordingly, it might have been appro-
priate to "center" the diffusion index at approximately the midpoint
of this interval, say, two or three quarters prior to the examination
date.8 This has in fact been done in Chart 6, in which the data have
been plotted two quarters earlier than shown in Table 17, so that they
may be appropriately compared with the reference cycle.
The results (the dark line in Chart 6) are of course rather erratic
since in each quarter so few banks are involved. In seven of the forty-
calendar quarters covered by the series, there are fewer than ten banks
in the sample. Nevertheless, the series shows a distinct cyclical pattern.
Troughs in the quarterly series are marked in the second quarter
of 1948, the third quarter of 1952, and the third quarter of 1956. It
must be noted that two other particularly low points were omitted: the
second quarter of 1954 and the first quarter of 1955. These lows appear
to result from erratic movements within a cyclical phase and were
instances in which the sample included less than ten banks. Peaks
in the series are placed in the third quarter of 1951 and the third
quarter of 1955. A peak may also have occurred in the fourth quarter
of 1947 (or earlier). The index thus moves up during business cycle
contractions, reaching its peak rather early in the expansions. After
attaining its peak, it declines sharply, failing to its low point well
before the onset of recession.
When the data are smoothed by a four-quarter centered moving
average (the thinner line on Chart 6), the erratic fluctuations in the
underlying figures largely disappear, and the turning points become
more distinct. Three turning points appear a little later (each by one
quarter) and one turning point is unaffected; we cannot be certain,
of course, about possible additional turns at the beginning and close
of the period.
Banks showing no change in the ratio between examinations were counted as
one-half. All such instances were cases in which banks had no criticized loans at
all in the two examinations being compared.
SIndeed,the individual bank data might have been centered in this way—i.e.,
the change in criticism rate being recorded at the midpoint of the interval between
successive examinations rather than at the end of that interval.
58Criticism Rates as Indicators of Credit Quality
CHART6
Percentage of Banks with Rising Loan Quality,
by Quarters, 1948-57
A rise in loan quality means a fall in the criticism rate from that at the
preceding examination. Shaded areas refer to reference cycle contractions according
to National Bureau monthly chronology. Dots identify specific cycle turns in original
data; circles identify specific cycle turns in the moving average.
SOURCE: Table 17. All data have been moved back two calendar quarters.
59The Quality of Bank Loans
As already indicated, the diffusion index is a measure, based on
a bank-by-bank count, of change in quality between successive examina-
tions. Of the various measures of criticism rates (shown in Chart 2).,
it comes closest, in concept, to the rate of change of the per-bank
ratios of substandard to business loans shown in panel B of Table 13.
A distinct relation does, in fact, exist between the smoothed diffusion
index and the year-to-year changes in that series (Chart 7). More-
over, when the unsmoothed diffusion index is cumulated (Table 18),
thus in principle "generating" a moving average of criticism rates,
the resulting series is fairly free from large erratic movements and, at
least from 1950 on, conforms well to the per-bank criticism rates
(Chart 8)Whilethese results are not conclusive, they establish a
fairly strong presumption. that a larger sample would confirm the
existence of a meaningful quarterly pattern in examiner criticism rates.
TABLE18
CUMULATEDDIFFUSION INDEX OF LOAN QUALITY, 1948-57
Quarter





















SouRcE: Calculated from Table 17, top panel, by deducting 50 from each
quarter and cumulating the remainder from quarter to quarter.
9 nature of this moving average may be illustrated as follows. Assume that
observations existed for only one date each year, say, the first of the year. Centered
observations for the year-to-year changes between successive annual observations
would then be placed at midyear. Under these circumstances, accumulation of the
diffusion index would "generate" a derived series of annual levels. This is in effect
what has been done in the present case, except that data for year-to-year changes
were available for four quarters a year rather than for just one date.
60Year-to-year change
in rate(inverted)
NOTE: Criticism rates refer to ratio of substandard to business loans.
SOURCE: Tables 13 and 17.
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large banks
Criticism Rates as Indicators of Credit Quality
CHART7
Smoothed Quarterly Index of Examiner Criticism Rates and
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CHART8
Cumulated Diffusion Index and Various Series of Criticism Rates
Per cent
NoTE; Shaded areas refer to reference cycle contractions
tional Bureau monthly chronology.
according to Na-
SOURCE: Tables 12, 13, and 18. Cumulative diffusion index has been moved
back two quarters for "centering" purposes.
62
Per cent
1947'48'49 '50 '51 '52'53'54'55 '56 '57Critici$m Rates as Indicators of Credit Quality
Summary
In summary, bank loan criticism rates calculated from examiner
reports not only contribute to the understanding of banking structure
and developments but may also have some validity as summary indi-
cators of changes in loan quality and as business cycle indicators.
Fluctuations in criticism rates appeared to lead bank loan losses as
well as some more inclusive indicators of credit quality. A quarterly
"diffusion" index prepared from the data—the percentage of banks
showing improvement in the critièism rate compared with their pre-
vious examination—showed a distinct cyclical pattern.
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